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Morality, Law and the Duty to Act: Creating a Common 
Law Duty to Act Modeled After the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine 
McCall C. Carter* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 1997, high school senior David Cash accompanied his 
friend, Jeremy Strohmeyer, to a resort and casino along the 
California-Nevada border. That night, Cash witnessed Strohmeyer 
rape and murder Sherrice Iverson, a seven-year old girl. Despite 
catching Strohmeyer in the act, Cash did and said nothing; rather, 
he went outside and waited for his friend to join him.1 While 
Strohmeyer is currently serving a life sentence for the crime, Cash 
received no civil or criminal penalty, but instead went on to study 
engineering at Berkley.2 This is because Nevada and California, 
following the American common law tradition, did not require an 
affirmative duty to act to prevent a criminal act.3 
 Three years earlier, a similar atrocious act occurred, this 
time resulting many more victims. The Hutus in Rwanda began 
their systematic process of completely annihilating the Tutsi race.4 
The violence lasted one hundred days5 and claimed the lives of 
roughly 800,000 men, women, and children.6 As machetes were 
being sharpened and used every day, the rest of the world stood 
still and watched in horror.7 While small actions were taken to 
bring peacekeeping forces to Rwanda, their narrow mandate made 
the forces unable to actually protect the victims.8 The result 
                                                
*J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Washington University School of Law.  
1 Slaying Suspect’s Friend Not Seen As Accomplice, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1997, 
at A16.  
2 “Sherrice Iverson Bill” Becomes Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2000, at B4; 
Doug Bandow, Can Shame Do What Laws Cannot Do?, SAN-DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Feb. 16, 2000, at B10.  
3 Sam Diaz, Slain Girl Inspires Bills on Witnesses Proposals, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 10, 1998, at B1.  
4 U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999). 
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 26-27. See also S.C. Res. 912 ¶ 8, U.N. Doc S/RES/912 (April 21, 1994) 
(“Decides . . . to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR as follows: (a) To act as an 
intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a 
cease-fire; (b) To assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to 
the extent feasible; and (c) To monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, 
including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with 
UNAMIR . . . .”). 
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effectively created an international audience to the domestic 
massacre.  
 The two stories above, though they involve different races, 
times, and hemispheres, have something in common. A horrible 
crime was committed with witnesses watching, but no one 
responded to either situation in order to stop the criminal act. 
While the United Nations had more time to act and needed the 
approval of others to intervene successfully, the underlying 
premise remains the same: morality required action to stop the 
crimes. But was there a legal duty?  
 It is well-established that American common law does not 
require an affirmative duty to rescue, absent special 
circumstances.9 The focus of this note is to examine the underlying 
philosophy behind the refusal to introduce an affirmative duty in 
American common law, and to compare and contrast it with the 
developing “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine in 
international law, which imposes an affirmative duty to act on a 
much larger scale.  
 Part I will examine the history and philosophy of the 
American common law “no duty to act rule.” Part II will cover the 
history and the development of the R2P doctrine in international 
law, arguments for and against the doctrine, and its underlying 
philosophy. This note will argue that even though the underlying 
philosophies of American and international law differ, there is no 
reason why the American system cannot join the rest of the world 
in creating a legal duty to act.  
 
I. THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW “NO DUTY TO ACT RULE” 
 
 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 314 states, 
“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his 
part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself 
impose upon him a duty to take such action.”10 This reflected that 
the common law rule comes from the dichotomy established in 
early common law between “misfeasance” and “nonfeasance.”11 
Misfeasance involves an actual action that harms another person, 
while nonfeasance is the lack of action that leads to harm to 
another.  
  
                                                
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). 
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
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 A.  Historical Reasons for the Rule 
 There are several theories as to why a duty to act was slow 
to develop in common law. The Restatement argues that it was 
inefficient because courts and governments had enough forms of 
misbehavior to regulate, and they simply did not have time to 
regulate non-actions.12 Other jurists, such as law professor Nancy 
Levit, propose a cultural and religious reason for the lack of an 
affirmative duty to rescue.13 Levit argues that regulating non-
actions through tort law was not necessary, because religion was so 
pervasive within society, and “[p]eople thought they would burn in 
hell”14 for such immoral actions as refusing to help those in need.15 
A more formalistic approach ascribes the Latin maxim unicuique 
tribuere jus sum.16 Prior to the late eighteenth century, “[t]he duties 
of justice could be compelled and were properly within the 
competence of the state, unlike the duties of charity; these the state 
left to ‘Him who searches the heart’.”17 
 Although the ultimate source of this omission may be 
debated, it is not contested that originally there were legitimate 
reasons for not requiring an affirmative duty to act.18 However, as 
the law evolved, society did not face the enforcement problems of 
the middle ages, rendering the efficiency argument moot.19 
Religion’s involvement in law is now practically extinct,20 and 
“[n]ation, not religion . . . [has become] . . . the glue of society.21 In 
spite of these cultural changes, the development of the American 
rule continued well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
While new justifications for this doctrine have emerged,22 they are 
not persuasive enough to supersede the moral duty that exists.   
 
                                                
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §314C (1965).  
13 Nancy Levit, The Kindness of Strangers: Interdisciplinary Foundations of a 
Duty to Act, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 463 (2001).  
14 Id. at 467.  
15 Id. at 468. 
16 Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad, and Ugly: A Comparative Law 
Analysis, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 78 (2005). The English translation 
of this maxim is “Justice is the set and constant purpose which gives to every 
man his due.” Id. at n.4.  
17 Id. at 78. 
18 However, Plato’s Laws did provide for an affirmative duty to act, with the 
penalty for non-action being a fine. Id. at n.19.  
19 Id. at 82, n. 23.  
20 Levitt, supra note 13, at 468.  
21 Schiff, supra note 16, at 114.  
22 See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. 
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B. Development in American Common Law 
 The most well known description of the American no duty 
to act rule is found in Buch v. Amory Manufacturing. Co.23 In this 
case, an eight-year old boy, who was unable to understand English, 
followed his brother to his work at a manufacturing plant.24 
However, while there, the owner of the manufacturing plant 
ordered the eight-year old to leave, but he did not understand.25 No 
further attempts were made by the owner to induce the boy to exit 
the premises, and an accident later occurred, injuring the boy.26 
The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant owed no more duty of 
care than to a trespasser.27 The court stated that the “duty to do no 
wrong is a legal duty,”28 and the “duty to protect against wrong is, 
generally speaking, and excepting certain intimate relations in the 
nature of trust, a moral obligation only . . . .”29 According to the 
Court, this duty was not legally enforceable because “[w]ith purely 
moral obligations, the law does not deal.”30 Supporting the 
argument with the biblical story of the Good Samaritan, the Court 
continued,  “the priest and Levite who passed by on the other side 
were not . . . liable at law for the continued suffering . . . which 
they might, and morally ought to have, prevented or relieved.”31 
 Despite this strong opinion, five categories of exceptions to 
the common law rule have evolved. Although the black letter law 
still exists, these five inroads significantly weaken the traditional 
no duty to act rule, as “in most rescue situations, one of the 
exceptions is likely to apply.”32  
The exceptions to this rule apply when there exists: 
(1) negligent injury by a defendant;  
(2) innocent injury by a defendant;  
(3) special relationships;  
(4) defendants who assume a responsibility to 
undertake a rescue; or  
                                                
23 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898). 
24 Id. at 809.  
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 810 (The exact facts of the injury and accident were not disclosed.).  
27 Id. at 811.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Buch A. at 810. 
31 Id.  
32 Jennifer L. Groniger, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a 
Victim Lying in the Street? What is Left of the American Rule, and Will It 
Survive Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 357 (1999).  
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(5) statutes.33  
The first of the five exceptions, negligent injury by a 
defendant, follows the traditional tort concept of duty.34 If a 
defendant, by his or her negligence, causes harm to another, the 
defendant “must take all steps necessary to mitigate the hurt.”35 
The second, innocent injury by a defendant, is more of an 
exception, because it does not involve an actual act of negligence 
by the defendant. An innocent injury by a defendant involves 
instances where the defendant, though not through negligence or 
any fault, creates the situation that causes the plaintiff harm.36 The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts describes this exception as one 
where a defendant’s “act, or instrumentality within his control, has 
inflicted upon another such harm that the other is helpless and in 
danger.”37 This exception, while less in line with traditional tort 
doctrines, still does not create a true affirmative duty to rescue, as 
the defendant is not completely a bystander, since his own actions 
created the perilous situation.38  
The third exception is triggered when there is a special 
relationship between the rescuer and the person being rescued, or 
between the rescuer and a third party.39 The first category includes 
relationships between: a captain and seamen, an employer and 
employees, parents and children, a jailor and prisoners, and to a 
more limited extent, shopkeepers and customers.40 There 
commonly exists a duty to rescue within such relationships. 
Although some states may apply an affirmative duty to rescue to 
the shopkeeper-customer relationship, others simply impose a duty 
not to prevent a rescue by a third person.41 The special relationship 
between a rescuer and a third party is a bit more complex. Such 
relationships may include parents and children, but also involve 
such relationships as between psychiatrist and patient. This 
relationship becomes a basis for liability when the rescuer “has the 
power to control the actions of [the] third party.”42 These 
                                                
33 Id. at 355-56.  
34 Id. at 357.  
35 Id. (citing Parrish v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 20 S.E.2d 299 (N.C. 1942)).  
36 Id. at 358.  
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 cmt. A (1965).  
38 Groniger, supra note 32, at 359.  
39 Id. at 359. 
40 Id. at 360. Some states (such as California) enforce a duty on a shopkeeper 
and customer if the customer is on the premises belonging to the shopkeeper, but 
do not carry this duty outside of the shop. Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 361.  
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relationships are complex because not only must a court find that 
the defendant actually had the power to control the actions of 
another (difficult in and of itself), but also because the states differ 
in determining which third party relationships trigger such a duty.43 
For instance, while some states only require the closest of 
relationships, other states consider relations as removed as a social 
guest and host to create a duty to rescue.44 
The fourth exception is less obvious. This exception 
involves the voluntary assumption of duty by attempting a rescue. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that one who voluntarily 
attempts a rescue “is subject to liability . . . for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking if . . . his failure to exercise such care increases the 
risk of such harm.”45 This exception creates an ironic result, 
seemingly contrary to the purposes of the exceptions. If one does 
not attempt a rescue, there is no cause for liability to arise; 
however, if one does try to rescue another, he or she must be sure 
to do so with the utmost care to avoid liability. Thus the effect is to 
discourage rather than encourage rescue attempts.46 One way that 
states have attempted to counter this result is to enact Good 
Samaritan statutes.47 These statutes limit the liability of 
professionals such as doctors and other medical personnel, in order 
to encourage these individuals to attempt rescues.48 The standard 
for liability is raised from simple negligence to reckless 
disregard.49 Reckless disregard implies some knowledge that the 
actions taken will have significant effects, and takes into account 
the fact that emergency situations, and therefore the duty of care, 
                                                
43 Id. at 362.  
44 See Groniger, supra note 32, at 361-63.  
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §323 (1965).  
46 Groniger, supra note 32, at 364. 
47 Id. at 364.  
48 Id. at 364-65. An example of the wording and content of a Good Samaritan 
statute is provided in the CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL CODE. It 
states, “no licensee, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an 
emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or 
omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 2395 (West 1990)).  
49 Id. at 364-65. This raised negligence standard also applies to legal advice in 
emergency situations. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 3 
(2003) (“In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in 
which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required . . . . [but] assistance 
should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances . . . .”).  
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often differ from those of everyday life.50 Some form of a Good 
Samaritan statute exists in each of the fifty states, as well as the 
District of Columbia.51 
The last exception to the black letter law providing no duty 
to act is statutes.52 States may enact laws that require a rescue 
attempt for a wide range of situations. Some states require specific 
governmental agencies to act,53 while others only have hit and run 
statutes.54 Six states have enacted affirmative duty to act laws that 
require action when the situation involves an “easy rescue.”55  
 Despite the force of the exceptions above, common judge-
made law still refuses to create an affirmative duty to act, absent 
the exceptions above.56 While the exceptions may cover many 
rescue situations, they still fail to cover those such as the rape and 
murder of Sherrice Iverson described at the beginning of this 
note.57 Statutory exceptions seem to be an “easy fix” for such 
problems, but oftentimes states do not enact such statutes until a 
tragedy of such momentous proportions has occurred that the 
legislature is spurred to action.58 Why then, cannot the common 
law provide a resolution to the problem? 
                                                
50 Id. at 365. Groniger gives the example of a doctor who aids a hitchhiker by 
suturing his wounds, but does not clean the wound first (removing the dirt and 
gravel); subsequently, the doctor is not liable for resulting harm, “even though 
the doctor’s negligent care caused further harm.” However, “a rescuer cannot 
drag a victim halfway across the street and then decide to leave him.” Id. at 363.  
51 Id. at 366.  
52 Groniger, supra note 32, at 364, 367.  
53 Agencies such as the Department of Family Services, who may be required to 
assist children when an investigation has shown abuse. Id. 368.  
54 Id. at 367. A West Virginian court held a defendant liable for “failing to 
rescue the plaintiff ‘as quickly as possible’ upon hitting him.” Id. 
55 Id. at 367-68, n. 156. “An easy rescue is [a case] where a victim is in danger 
and a potential rescuer is in a position to alleviate the harm without any 
significant cost to himself.” Id. at 368. Vermont has a statute requiring such 
action, which states:  
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave 
physical harm, shall, to the extent that the same can be 
rendered without danger or peril to himself or without 
interference with important duties owed to others, give 
reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that 
assistance or care is being provided by others. 
 Id.  
56 See, e.g., Buch, 44 A. 810 (Regarding the fact that the court found no duty to 
act).  
57 See supra note 3. These exceptions did not apply to David Cash because he 
did not cause the harm, he did not have a special relationship with the victim, 
nor did he voluntarily assume the duty to rescue her.  
58 See supra note 2.  
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C.  Continuing Strength of the Rule 
 Is it only tradition that keeps the common law no duty to 
act rule alive? No. This common law principle continues to exist 
because the underlying philosophy of American common law is 
adverse to such a stringent regulation on an individual’s actions.59  
From the founding of the United States, individual rights 
have been a focus of United States’ politics and law.60 The 
American mentality may be summed up by the statement, “‘a 
rugged, independent individual needs no help from others, save 
such as they may be disposed to render him out of kindness, or 
such as he can induce them to render by the ordinary process of 
bargaining, without having the government step in to make them 
help.’”61 In addition to this argument, there is the fear that once the 
common law steps in to enforce this moral act, it will not stop.62 
As Levit phrases this objection as, “[i]f we require strangers to 
help each other, will the government next compel private citizens 
to donate to charity, feed the poor or house the homeless?”63  
The theory of economics argues that it is “efficient” to 
continue the no duty to act rule, because the “law should encourage 
self-reliance.”64 If the government required an affirmative duty to 
act, citizens may avoid activities in order to avoid necessary 
rescues.65 Economic theory further rationalizes that the results 
would not justify the effort it would take to affect such a change.66 
The theory of “un-coerced compliance” states that there is no need 
for an affirmative duty to protect rule because most people would 
attempt “easy rescues” absent such a legal maxim.67 Moreover, the 
existence of such a maxim would cause only a few people to 
change their behavior.68  
                                                
59 See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.  
60 Id.  
61 Levit, supra note 13, at 468, n.28.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 468.  
64 Id. at 469. 
65 Id. at 469. “‘For example, someone who swims well might avoid beaches 
where poor swimmers are known to swim,’ or might choose to play racquetball 
instead of going for a swim to avoid all those pesky potential drowning victims.” 
Id. (citing Eric H. Grush, The Inefficiency of a No-Duty to Rescue Rule and a 
Proposed “Similar Risk” Alternative, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 882 (1998)). 
66 Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably 
Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1464 (2008). 
67 Id. at 1464, 1469.  
68 Id.  
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Another theory of protecting the current status quo looks to 
the objectives and purposes of tort law itself.69 This theory states 
that tort law is supposed to deter active, rather than passive harm.70  
Of these three different theories, the one that will be 
explored more in depth is that the philosophical basis of American 
common law, which, by emphasizing the individual, creates an 
obstacle to establishing an affirmative duty to act or protect.  
  
D.  Individualism in American Jurisprudence 
It is a commonly held belief that Americans tend to be 
more individualistic than many of our international counterparts.71 
This theory is supported by the fact that no affirmative duty to 
rescue has yet made it into American common law.72 Interestingly 
enough, individualism is not a “Western” phenomenon.73 Rather, is 
it one of Anglo-American legal and political theory.74 Civil law 
countries are much more likely to impose an affirmative duty to 
rescue,75 so what is it about Anglo-American law that causes us to 
differ in this respect?  
The emergence of social contract theory and the protection 
of individual rights marked a significant shift in Anglo-American 
thinking, and heavily influenced America’s founding fathers.76 The 
underlying theme of all social contract theories is one in which 
individuals give up some of their rights to a governing body so that 
they may live in peace and relative social harmony.77 This 
                                                
69 Levit, supra note 13, at 469 
70 Id. Levit characterizes this position as follows: “[t]ort law should handle 
affirmatively dangerous conduct—causing harm—not doing nothing.” Id.  
71 Daniel J. Elazar, Constitutional Rights in the Federal System, 22 PUBLIUS 2, 
1, 3 (1971). Elazar states, “[t]o think of the United States without is emphasis on 
individual rights would be to deny the history of the American civil society.”  
72 Despite such a duty having made it into many civil law codes. See supra notes 
10-11 accompanying text. See also infra note 76.  
73 Sarah Harkness, Charles M. Super & Nathalie van Tijen, Individualism and 
the “Western Mind” Reconsidered: American and Dutch Parents’ Ethnotheories 
of the Child, 87 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEV. 23, 37 (Spr. 
2000).  
74 Schiff, supra note 16, at 120-21.  
75 Id. at 121. Schiff points to civil law countries’ tendency toward social welfare 
states, and their belief that the state is able to intervene and do good in people’s 
lives.  
76  Andrew Woodcock, Jacques Maritain, Natural Law and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 8 J. HIST. INT’L LAW 245 (2006). See infra n. 92.  
77 MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT 
TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 102 (2004) (discussing the development of 
social contract theory).  
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philosophy begins and ends with the individual, while discussing 
how the individual interacts vis-à-vis the government in the 
middle.78 Examples of such can be found in the philosophies of 
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.79  
While Thomas Hobbes invented the idea of a social 
contract, John Locke altered it so as to become the basis of modern 
political thought.80 Locke focused his Second Treatise of 
Government on the notion of “consent.”81 Locke states that 
“[n]othing can make any man . . . [a member of a commonwealth] 
but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and 
express promise and contract. . . . [c]oncerning the beginning of 
political societies, [it is] . . . consent which makes any one a 
member of any commonwealth.”82 For Hobbes, man entered a 
social contract to avoid violence and war,83 but Locke believed that 
man’s motivation was much more individual—that is, the 
“preservation of their property.”84 
John Stuart Mill continued the evolution of social contract 
by adding a utilitarian aspect to the theory.85 Concerned that 
Locke’s version of the social contract would lead to a “tyranny of 
the majority,”86 Mill developed his own theory that gave strong 
protections to minorities and individuals. In his essay, On Liberty, 
Mill states:  
the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. . . . He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it 
will be better for him to do so, [or] . . 
                                                
78 See infra discussion on notes 81-82.  
79 See infra discussion on notes 81-99. 
80 ISHAY, supra note 77, at 285.  
81 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305 (photo. reprint 1794) 
(1690). 
82 Id. (emphasis added).  
83 ISHAY, supra note 77, at 285.  
84 Locke, supra note 81, at 307.  
85 Phillip W. Romohr, A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical 
Foundations of the No-Duty-To-Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1038 (2006). 
86
 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (London, 189-?), available at 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MOML?af=RN&ae=F104427827&srchtp=
a&ste=14. 
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. in the opinions of others, to do so 
would be wise, or even right.87  
 
Later in his essay Mill goes even further when he says “[o]ver 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.”88 Though Mill allows room for an affirmative duty to 
act in his essay,89 he dedicates the majority of his work on the 
limits of governmental control over the individual.90  
 Rousseau continued the discussion of a social contract. 
Even though he talks of the “general will,” this thought is used 
only to advance the “view of political representation as 
representation, not of order[,] . . . estates, . . . social functions or 
social classes, but of individual interests.”91 Rousseau is most 
famously quoted to have said, “Man is born free, and everywhere 
he is chains.”92 According to the scholar Frances Svensson, “[t]he 
chains to which Rousseau refers are those of the group, the social 
unit which superimposes itself on the individual.”93 This is because 
medieval governance provided no rights or place for the 
individual,94 “[t]hus community per se came to be branded with 
the stigma of oppression.”  
The philosophies of Mill, Locke, and Rousseau are often 
attributed to have influenced the Founders of the Constitution.95 
When looking at the Bill of Rights, one is struck by the numerous 
occurrences of the phrases, “the right of the people,”96 and “by the 
people.”97 While “the people” may seem like a collective social 
                                                
87 Id. at 13.   
88 Id. at 14.  
89 Id. at 15-16. Mill states, “[t]here are also many positive acts for the benefit of 
others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform . . . such as saving a 
fellowcreature’s life . . . things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to 
do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing.” However, 
Mill continues that “[t]o make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the 
rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively 
speaking, the exception.”  
90 Id. at 12.  
91
 Frances Svensson, Liberal Democracy and Group Rights: The Legacy of 
Individualism and Its Impact on American Indian Tribes, XXVII POL. STUD. 3, 
421, 424 (citing S. LUKES, INDIVIDUALISM 79-80 (Oxford, Blackwell 1973)).  
92 Id. (citing JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND 
DISCOURSES 3 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950).  
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, II IV, X.  
97 Id. at amend. IX.  
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entity, a look at the other amendments shows that “the people” are 
only a collection of individuals.98 
It is easy to understand how the Founders were impressed 
with liberal political theory that emphasized the individual. 
Because America was founded based on a break from the British 
monarchy, the founders distrusted a strong centralized 
government.99  If the government is to be limited, then it is logical 
for individual rights to fill the vacuum that is remaining.  However, 
this focus on individual rights has created a conflict of competing 
rights when it comes to the establishment of a duty to rescue.100 
While the rescuer has a right not to be needlessly bound by moral 
duties imposed by the state, the victim has a right to life, which 
may be violated if the failure to rescue results in death.101  
The protection of the rescuer from excessive government 
interference is demonstrated in the common law between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance.102 Misfeasance, when the harm is 
caused by a positive action of the rescuer, 103 can be regulated 
because the rescuer has reached the limit established by Mill.104 
Nonfeasance, on the other hand, involves no wrong doing by the 
rescuer, but by another person entirely.105 The only action taken by 
the rescuer is that of inaction, which may cause or worsen the 
harm to the victim.106 In such situations, the rescuer has committed 
no legal wrong, and though a moral wrong may have been 
committed, “[l]egal duties are enforceable; moral duties are 
not.”107  
But by protecting the rights of the rescuer, the law fails to 
protect the rights of the victim.108 However, many argue that to 
                                                
98 See id. at amend. III, V, and VI. These amendments provide specific rights to 
specific individuals in specific situations.  
99 Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, Constitutionalism and Democracy—
Political Theory and the American Constitution, 27 B.J.POL.SCI. 595, 599 (Oct. 
1997).  
100 Romohr, supra note 85, at 1044.  
101 Id. Romohr makes a similar argument in terms of positive versus negative 
rights.  
102 Id. at 1030. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
103 Id. at 1030-31.  
104 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.  
105 Romohr, supra note 85, at 1030.  
106 Id. at 1030.  
107 Id. at 1029.  
108 To take Mill’s theory literally, it could be argued that there exists no right 
that the law may enforce because to require a rescue would not prevent harm, as 
harm has most likely already been done. It may be possible to imply that 
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protect the rights of the victim, the law would drift into the realm 
of morality, “allowing courts to enforce moral obligations [that] 
would let them substitute the law with ‘varying ideas of morals 
which the changing incumbents of the bench might from time to 
time entertain.’”109 It is somewhat ironic that the most vehement 
objection to establishing an affirmative duty to act is that it would 
require the enforcement of “moral obligations.”110 With the 
assumption that many laypeople believe that law and morality are 
closely related,111 there are two significant worries that American 
jurists have regarding the intertwining of the two.112 When 
discussing morality, it is important to ask, “whose morality?” Is it 
the job of the law to reflect society’s morality as the majority 
views it,113 or is there a morality that is beyond public opinion, 
which makes it law’s obligation “to actively encourage better 
behavior[?]”114 This debate concerning the relationship to law and 
morality is a long standing one, and one that this note attempts to 
continue in a limited way. While not advocating a legislating of 
morality, the remainder of this note will argue that American tort 
law should more closely resemble the relationship between 
morality and law as found in the “Responsibility to Protect” 
doctrine in international law.  
 
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE 
  
A. History and Development of the Doctrine 
The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, or R2P as it is 
commonly called, is a relatively recent doctrine within the realm of 
international law. The actual doctrine was developed in 2001 by 
the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (“ICISS”), a commission the government of Canada 
                                                                                                         
preventing harm also means preventing further harm, in which case Mill’s 
theory is not as incompatible with an affirmative duty as it once seemed.  
109 Romohr, supra note 85, at 1029 (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 
281, 283 (Kan. 1903)); but see, Anthony D’Amato, Legal Realism Explains 
Nothing, 1 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 1 (2009) (regarding the assertion that legal 
realism has allowed for courts to take on such a moral-eforcing role.). 
110 Because many Americans believe that law and morality interact. 
111 This combination of law and morality is admittedly a more “natural law” 
tendency, much separated from positivist theory.  
112 Romohr, supra note 85, at 1037.  
113 Where public opinion defines the majority view.  
114 Romohr, supra note 85, at 1036. This morality beyond public opinion would 
be what is considered natural law, to be discussed in relation to international law 
in Part III, infra.  
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initiated.115 Four years after the commission introduced the notion, 
the United Nations adopted the doctrine at its 2005 World 
Summit.116 In fact, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the 
R2P doctrine in adopting the Outcome Document of the 2005 
World Summit.117 The Outcome Document adequately summarizes 
the doctrine, stating:  
 
Each individual State has the responsibility to 
protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. 
The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise 
this responsibility and support the United Nations . 
. . .118 
 
The World Summit also led to discussion and resolution of the 
enforcement of R2P, stating that, “[t]he international community, 
through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful  
means . . . .” 119 If these peaceful means fail, the doctrine also 
allows the use of force, 120 on which the Outcome Document 
elaborated, stating:  
 
we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, 
in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter 
VII . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity . . . . 121 
 
                                                
115 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come 
. . . and Gone? 22 INT’L REL. 283, 285 (2008).  
116 Id. at 284.  
117 Id. There are currently 150 countries in the General Assembly. 
118 The General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. 
A/60/L.1 (Sept. 20, 2005). 
119 Id. at ¶ 139.  
120 According to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
121 Id.  
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A year later, the Security Council approved the R2P doctrine when 
it adopted Resolution 1674, which is “a thematic resolution on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict . . . specifically invoking 
this is the context of . . . Darfur.”122 The resolution itself reaffirmed 
such provisions of the Outcome Document as mentioned above.123 
The R2P continued to gain strength under Secretary General Ban 
Ki-moon’s leadership.124 He even went so far as say to at the 
African Union Summit in 2008, “I am fully committed to keeping 
the momentum that you the leaders have made at the 2005 World 
Summit and will spare no effort to operationalize the responsibility 
to protect.”125 In 2007 and 2008, the doctrine gained even more 
recognition as the outbreaks of violence in Kenya were classified 
as an “R2P situation.”126  
 However, R2P is not without its opponents. Most 
significantly were the delegates to the United Nations Budget 
Committee from Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.127 In 
early 2008, they stated “the World Summit rejected R2P in 2005” 
and “the concept of the responsibility to protect [had] not been 
adopted by the General Assembly.”128 The sudden shift of opinion 
is thought to be linked to the colonial influences in the developing 
world, whose independence from colonial rule is still too close for 
comfort when it comes to the weakening of state sovereignty. 
These concerns were voiced when Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 
attempted to further the institutional strength of the doctrine by 
proposing the creation of a position of Special Adviser on the 
Responsibility to Protect, which would provide “teeth” to the 
doctrine.129 It appears that the international community is more 
than willing to accept the doctrine in words, but many nations balk 
when it comes to actual application and enforcement of the R2P.  
 
B. Specifics of the Doctrine 
The R2P doctrine was specifically developed to counteract 
the humanitarian and security concerns related to intra-state 
conflict. The doctrine has two basic principles—state sovereignty 
                                                
122 Evans, supra note 115, at 287.  
123 S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (April 28, 2006).  
124 Evans, supra note 115, at 286.  
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 287.  
127Evans, supra note 115, at 288.  
128Id.  
129Id.  
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and international responsibility.130 State sovereignty is transformed 
from the Westphalian notion as held for the last four hundred years 
and becomes not a right, but a responsibility.131 The doctrine states 
that “the primary responsibility for the protection of its peoples lies 
within the state itself.”132 In this way R2P does not attempt to 
override a state’s sovereignty, or even weaken it. It respects a 
general principle of non-intervention133—international 
responsibility is only triggered when “a population is suffering 
serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt 
or avert it . . . .”134 This respect for sovereignty is present because 
it is essential to recognize that “[f]or many states and peoples, 
[sovereignty] is also a recognition of their equal worth and dignity, 
a protection of their unique identities and their national freedom, 
and an affirmation of their right to shape and determine their own 
destiny.”135 On the other hand, international action is also essential 
because the events of the 1990s led many people to believe “that, 
for all the rhetoric about the universality of human rights, some 
human lives end up mattering a great deal less to the international 
community than others.”136 It is also important for the international 
community to avoid “the risk of becoming complicit bystanders in 
massacre, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide.”137 
The sources and foundations of the doctrine are state 
sovereignty, the Security Council’s role under Article 24 of the 
United Nations Charter, international legal obligations included in 
treaties and customary international law, and the “developing 
practice of states.”138 There are three elements of the R2P doctrine: 
the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the 
responsibility to rebuild.139 The top priority, the responsibility to 
                                                
130 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
The Responsibility to Protect (2001), xi. State sovereignty is the idea that states 
should be free from interference into their domestic affairs. However, in recent 
years international responsibility has emerged because the world feels that it is 
responsible for responding to genocides like what happened in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
131 Evans, supra note 115, at 284.  
132 ICISS, supra note 130, at xi.  
133 Non-intervention is the idea that sovereignty is absolute and states should not 
intervene into the internal affairs of other states at any time.  
134 Id.  
135 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶ 1.32.  
136 Id. at ¶1.1.  
137 Id. at ¶ 1.22.  
138 ICISS, supra note 130, at xi.  
139 Id.  
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prevent, is a responsibility of both states and the international 
community to address the causes, both root causes and current 
causes, of the civil unrest and violence.140 The responsibility to 
react is a responsibility for the international community “to 
respond . . . with appropriate measures.”141 Such measures “may 
include coercive measures like sanctions and international 
prosecutions, and in extreme cases military intervention.”142 
Finally, the responsibility to rebuild is a responsibility of both the 
state and the international community “to provide . . . full 
assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation.”143 
During this stage of rebuilding, there also must be actions and 
policies to address “the causes of the harm the intervention was 
designed to halt or avert.”144 In all, the responsibilities form a type 
of circle, because the responsibility to rebuild requires the 
establishment of a system that fulfills the responsibility to prevent.  
The most controversial aspect of the R2P doctrine is the 
enforcement power to the doctrine: the permissibility of military 
action.145 This aspect of the doctrine is similar to humanitarian 
intervention.146 However, R2P is not humanitarian intervention.147 
The key difference between R2P and traditional notions of 
humanitarian intervention is that humanitarian intervention refers 
only to military operations after widespread violence has already 
begun.148 R2P, on the other hand, prioritizes prevention. If at all 
possible, the doctrine tries to avoid military action, preferring that 
the international community work with the State to solve the 
problems before violence breaks out.149 In addition, the doctrine 
sets out guidelines and considerations that must be met before 
military action can even become an option.150  
First, there must be “just cause.”151 Just cause arises only 
when there is actual or apprehended large scale loss of life and/or 
                                                
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id. This addition seemingly takes the state (and international community) 
back to the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening again, 
creating a kind of circle of responsibilities.  
145 Evans, supra note 115, at 290.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 291. 
151 ICISS, supra note 130, at xii. 
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large scale “ethnic cleansing.”152 Also, the considerations of right 
intention, last resort, proportionality, and reasonable prospects of 
success must be discussed and debated.  
As to right intention, the purpose of the intervention “must 
be to halt or avert human suffering.”153 Although notions of 
political expediency and state self-interest are involved in 
decisions made by the international community, such purposes are 
secondary to the primary purpose mentioned above.  
Secondly, the principle of last resort must be considered.154 
The principle of last resort states that military action may only take 
place “when every non-military option for the prevention or 
peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable 
grounds for believing lesser grounds would not have 
succeeded.”155 The second part of this consideration allows 
military action to be taken before all other avenues have been acted 
upon when a State has “reasonable grounds” or proof that those 
avenues would not stop the crisis.156 Though this may raise 
concerns regarding hasty action, it also allows the international 
community not to be bound to spend money and manpower on 
attempts at resolution that will likely fail. Because it is important to 
remember that during these abstract discussions, the fact is that 
people are dying on the ground.  
Thirdly, the principle of proportionality must be within 
every military action taken by the international community.157 
Proportionality involves not only the amount of force, but also the 
duration and intensity of the action.158 Lastly, there must be 
reasonable prospects of success.159 This utilitarian consideration 
looks to the “reasonable chance of success in halting or averting 
the suffering” as well as the requirement that “the consequences of 
action [are] not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction.”160  
The authority for enforcing R2P is through traditional U.N. 
processes.161 When an “R2P situation” arises, it is the 
                                                
152 Id.  
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. (emphasis added).  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 ICISS, supra note 130, at xii. 
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
161 Id.  
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responsibility of the Security Council to take action.162 Ideally, 
“[t]he Permanent Five . . . should agree not to apply their veto 
power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, 
to obstruct passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention 
for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise 
majority support.”163 Should the Security Council fail to be able to 
pass a resolution, there are two other alternatives.164 The General 
Assembly could convene in an Emergency Special Session under 
the “Uniting for Peace” procedure, or the responsibility to react 
can fall solely to regional and sub-regional organizations, as 
allowed for in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.165 
 
C. State Sovereignty and R2P 
Because international military intervention is a 
controversial matter, R2P is not without its own supporters and 
opponents. For many countries in the developing world, those most 
likely to be unable to fulfill their state responsibility because of 
lack of resources, state sovereignty, and its seeming weakening 
under R2P is a major concern.166 A journalist in Colombo is 
reported saying, “the so-called responsibility to protect is nothing 
but a license for the white man to himself intervene in the affairs of 
the dark sovereign countries, whenever the white man thinks it fit 
to do so.”167 This concern regarding sovereignty is not completely 
without merit. The doctrine certainly creates a paradigm shift in 
how sovereignty is viewed and when it can be legally pre-
empted.168  
For almost four hundred years, state sovereignty has been a 
foundation of the international system.169 This is not a negligible 
concept—the state represents the building block of the 
international order. It “provides order, stability and predictability 
in international relations since sovereign states are regarded as 
equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth.”170 At the 
beginning, this notion of sovereignty was absolute.171 There was 
                                                
162 Id.  
163 Id. at xiii. This is important because a single veto from a permanent five 
member of the Security Council can stop any resolution from passing.  
164 Id.  
165 ICISS, supra note 130 at xiii. 
166 Evans, supra note 115, at 285.  
167 Id. at 289.  
168 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 1.35, 2.14 
169 Evans, supra note 115, at 284. 
170 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶ 2.7. 
171 Evans, supra note 115, at 284.  
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never an appropriate time to enter into a state’s territory or to tell a 
state how it should govern its peoples. 172 In fact, “state sovereignty 
[was] a license to kill . . . it [was] no one’s business but their own 
if states murder[ed] or forcibly displac[ed] large numbers of their 
own citizens.”173 In the view of absolute state sovereignty, the only 
time that intervention is even remotely considered is when the 
internal conflict within a state threatens to destabilize a region.174 
This theory is similar to the idea of self-defense, but does not 
require government sanctioned military intervention.175 The 
modern view of sovereignty, however, is established in Articles 
2(1) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.176  
R2P does not completely erase state sovereignty—
sovereignty of states remains the norm, but the definition of 
sovereignty has changed under the doctrine.177 Rather, 
“sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally—to respect 
the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity 
and basic rights of all the people within the state.”178 This notion of 
sovereignty as a responsibility becomes binding on a state when 
they gain membership to the United Nations.179  This re-
characterization of sovereignty is not a completely novel idea.180 
Rather, it is an idea that has developed over the past fifty years 
through international law and state practice.181 It is here that 
several distinctions must be made. A tendency exists to equate R2P 
with “humanitarian intervention.” This, R2P is not.182 This 
distinction is essential to the discussion of sovereignty because 
humanitarian intervention implies a right of other nations to 
intervene, rather than the right of humans not to suffer.183 Because 
of this, R2P does not pose nearly the threat to sovereignty that the 
                                                
172 Id.  
173 Id.  
174 David M. Muttart, To Intervene or Not to Intervene, That is the Question. 2 
GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES 2, 7 (Sept. 2002).  
175 Id.  
176 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶2.7; Evans, supra note 115, at 284. Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter states, “Nothing should authorize intervention in matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.” U.N. Charter art. 2, 
para. 7.  
177 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 1.35, 2.14.  
178 Id. The UN Charter Article 2.1 simply states, “The [UN] is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” U.N. Charter art. 2.1. 
179 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶ 2.14 
180 Id. at ¶2.15 
181 Id. 
182 Evans, supra note 115, at 290.  
183 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶ 2.33. 
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doctrine of humanitarian intervention creates. 184 According to the 
Commission, the doctrine was called the responsibility to protect 
specifically because of the connotations that humanitarian 
intervention possesses—it “effectively operate[s] to trump 
sovereignty with intervention at the outset of the debate: it loads 
the dice in favour of intervention before the argument has even 
begun, by tending to label and delegitimize dissent as anti-
humanitarian.”185 In this way, R2P attempts to create a doctrine in 
which both state sovereignty and human rights are respected. 
Another way in which R2P attempts to protect state sovereignty is 
through the process in which the use of the doctrine is enacted. 186 
A state cannot unilaterally “intervene” and attempt to use the 
doctrine as a justification.187 The favored way of authorizing the 
doctrine is in the same way that all coercive measures are to be 
authorized—through the consent of the Security Council.188  
In this way the strongest critique and concern for the 
doctrine is able to be resolved. R2P is not out to “Westernize” the 
world, or to intervene wherever one or more countries see fit for 
political reasons. 189 State sovereignty is to be respected at all 
times, and intervention is not to be the immediate reaction to 
atrocities. 190 It is the general idea that the principles of state 
sovereignty and human protection can and should coexist in 
harmony, but when they cease to be able to do so, whether because 
of the failure of the state or internal war, the international 
community has a duty to take measures to right the balance.191 
 
D. Does the R2P Doctrine Create a Double Standard?  
Another argument that is made by opponents of the R2P 
doctrine is that the doctrine will only be used “against” those states 
that are developing, weak, and friendless.192 This argument is also 
not without merit. Supporters of this argument point to the state of 
                                                
184 Id. at ¶2.28. 
185 Id.  
186 Id. at ¶6.14. 
187 Id. It is important to note that the intervention of the United States into Iraq in 
2003 was not an example of R2P in action. See Evans, supra note 115, at 295. 
188 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶ 6.14, stating: “It is the Security Council which 
should be making the hard decisions in the hard cases about overriding state 
sovereignty.” This is how use of force and coercive measures is supposed to be 
authorized, not how it actually is always authorized.  
189 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  
190 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
191 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶¶8.31, 8.32.  
192 Evans, supra note 115, at 293.  
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international politics and the role that state power plays in it. 193 
What if a state such as China, Russia, or even the United States 
became an “R2P situation”?  Is it feasible that the international 
community would really be able to use coercive measures, and in 
an extreme situation, military intervention against them? 
Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to conclusively rid 
international politics of this double standard. 194 In addressing this 
argument the Commission stated that even though “the reality that 
interventions may not be able to be mounted in every case where 
there is justification for doing so, [it] is no reason for them not to 
be mounted in any case.”195 Though to the cynic this statement 
seems to be nothing but hollow encouragement, under the theory 
and belief that states follow international obligations because they 
feel morally obligated to do so, and they desire the respect of their 
fellow nation states, this argument seems to have more force. 196 
The international “peer pressure” that occurs in world politics can, 
and has, influenced state behavior.197 Even though states with 
strong military power are not likely to have their sovereignty 
breached because of the R2P doctrine, one can hypothesize that 
they have the most to lose in terms of international good will and 
respect. Therefore, while the double standard cannot be completely 
eradicated at this point (or perhaps ever), all hope should not be 
lost on the enforcement of R2P against stronger states.  
 
E. Community and Morality in International Law 
 A strong sense of morality and valuing others is found in 
the theory of Natural Law, which, simply put, is the belief “that 
there is a revelation of law beyond that defined by the institutional 
sources of law, and that there are certain basic concepts which 
ought to underlie all legal principles.”198 At its inception, natural 
law had a theological tilt to it, as evidenced by Cicero’s natural law 
                                                
193 Id.  
194 Id.  
195 ICISS, supra note 130, at ¶ 4.42. This statement seems to be a hollow 
attempting at leveling the playing fields. Perhaps appearances are influential 
enough, but the Commission appears to be saying the equivalent of an 
encouraging parent to their son or daughter— “even if you know that you won’t 
win, it’s not winning that’s important, it’s trying and playing the game!”  
196 Evans, supra note 115, at 294.  
197 Id. Evans points to the events in East Timor in 1999 as evidence of this. 
Indonesia, because of diplomatic and international pressure, allowed Australia in 
to protect the people of East Timor.  
198 Woodcock, supra note 76, at 245.  
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theory.199 Believing “that the world was the work of a divine 
entity,”200 Cicero saw man “as the highest of the divine 
creations”201 and thought the “preservation of the welfare of [m]an 
[was] the primary purpose of natural existence.”202 Modern 
thinkers of natural law do not emphasize the religious aspect, as 
much as they put forth the idea of the moral nature of law.203 
Despite where this morality comes from, a divine being or simply a 
shared psyche of the universe, natural law emphasizes the 
importance of the individual, but as an individual within society.204 
It is worth mentioning that Cicero does not posit that the 
preservation of society is the basis of the world’s existence, but 
man. The idea of a shared humanity is nothing new to international 
thought. The term “cosmopolitanism,” though the meaning has 
changed somewhat over time, has existed since the time of the 
Cynics, in the fourth century B.C.E.205 It continued to evolve 
throughout the Roman Empire, then fell away until Immanuel Kant 
and Christopher Martin Wieland revived it during the 
Enlightenment.206 While literally translated to “citizen of the 
cosmos,” the idea has taken on a new depth in recent thought, 
intertwining two notions, one being “the idea that we have 
obligations to others . . . that stretch beyond those to whom we are 
related by ties of kith and kind . . . or citizenship” as well as the 
idea “that we take seriously the value not just of human life but of 
particular human lives.”207  This view suggests a strong sense of 
justice, which is what, under natural law, best preserves 
mankind.208  
The response that this “justice” seems like an abstract 
concept is not untrue. Natural law, unlike positivism, looks not to 
texts to find justice, but believes that there are underlying 
principles, and that the texts and treaties are only helpful to the 
                                                
199 Id. at 249.  
200 Id.  
201 Id.  
202 Id.  
203 Id.  
204 Id. at 251.  
205 Appiah, Anthony, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company (2006), xiv.  
206 Id. at xiv-xv. 
207 Id. at xv.  
208 Henry F. Carey, Naturalism vs. Positivism: Debates Over Coercive 
Protection of Human Rights in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. 5 CIVIL WARS 2, 25, 
34 (2002).  
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point that they help us to determine those principles.209 Perhaps 
mankind has spent its entire history attempting to find these 
principles, and after many successes, as well a few mistakes, they 
codified these ideas in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“The Declaration”).210 Despite the fact that The Declaration is 
meant to codify those rights that are given to all simply by their 
reason of being human, and is not meant to originate from any one 
philosophical viewpoint, the phraseology and terms used convey a 
sense of community, and an underlying sense of some strain of 
natural law.211 
While endowing rights on all people as individuals, The 
Declaration uses a different semantic than the United States 
Constitution. The Declaration begins with a preamble that sets 
forth that these rights are “rights of all members of the human 
family,”212 and that such rights are “the foundation of . . . 
justice.”213 These rights are the aspirations of the “common 
people.”214 The Declaration’s first article states, “[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”215 The Declaration then goes 
on to list political and social rights in terms of those rights that are 
guaranteed to every individual human being, but applies a 
condition to such rights in Article 29.216 Article 29(1) states that 
“[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free 
and full development of his personality is possible.”217 While the 
United States Constitution endeavors to ensure individual rights 
and limit the role of the government, The Declaration provides for 
individual rights in the context of community, establishing duties 
to which a government owes to its people, and people to each 
other. These rights have been considered to be jus cogens norms,218 
that is, norms that are so entirely fundamental that they are 
                                                
209 Id. at 41.  
210 Woodcock, supra note 76, at 245.  
211 Unlike the wording of the Bill of Rights, see supra notes 93-95, which 
conveys individualism.  
212 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 1, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).  
213 Id.  
214 Id. (emphasis added).  
215 Id. at 72 (emphasis added).  
216 Id. at 78.  
217 Id. (emphasis added).  
218 See Woodcock, supra note 76, at 263.  
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considered to be preemptory.219 This is important because it shows 
just how deeply morality is engrained in international law. While 
social contract theorists speak of consent of the parties, 
international law speaks of moral duties that are owed to one 
another. This is perhaps the most striking difference between the 
founding document of the United States and the founding of 
document of the international order as we know it today.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In first-year Torts and Criminal Law classes, law students 
are faced with one of the most difficult aspects of American 
Common Law—duty. Many are shocked that there is no 
affirmative duty to rescue someone, even when it would come at 
little to no cost to the rescuer. Casebooks present horrible cases 
such as the one described in the first paragraph of this note to 
illustrate just how strict this American tradition is.  
 However, when one looks to the international world, there 
seems to be something different about the concept of duty. Perhaps 
it is because the world is made up of more than just common law 
legal systems, but perhaps it is something more. Social contract 
theory is able to be successfully applied to a small number of 
people, but a theorist has yet to develop a working model for the 
international world. States are guided by self-interest that is not 
determined only by one person (as in the social contract), but by 
many. So politics get in the way, and agreement and harmony 
seem to be elusive, yet desperately sought after aspirations. This 
never-ending search for common ground and community can be 
explained in the basis of natural law. Because of the lack of order 
in the international sphere, players in it are much more comfortable 
discussing the common morals and tenets to which they can all 
agree. Gone is the time of individualist state behavior; instead, one 
sees the world working together because it is the only way to 
achieve such lofty goals. It is for these reasons that international 
law has been able to develop such a duty as the R2P doctrine—
because community and morality are important, and assigning 
duties is nothing new.  
 American common law however, does not seem to share 
this sense of duty. Instead, the rugged individualism as found in 
Locke, Mill, Rousseau, and the Constitution stress the importance 
of freedom from duty, and complete self-determination, regardless 
of the community. The government is not seen as a force for good 
                                                
219 Id. at 261.  
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or as an organization that can encourage the humankind to be their 
best selves; rather, it is constantly limited and restricted for the fear 
of what such duties would require of the average citizen. However, 
the Restatement has predicted that the no-duty-to-act rule in 
American law will continue to diminish because of the “extreme 
cases of morally outrageous and indefensible conduct” that goes 
unpunished because of it.220  
 It is possible to model a revision of the American rule after 
the R2P doctrine. If one takes the analogy of states representing 
individuals in a global society, parallels between both doctrines 
emerge. The R2P doctrine has not emerged from a long history of 
affirmative duty. Prior to the formation of the United Nations, one 
could characterize the state of the international system as one of 
complete individual liberty, with no affirmative duty to act to 
prevent harm.221 However, as efficiency in regulating international 
politics grew, an affirmative duty began to emerge.222  
 Each of the exceptions that are found in the American no-
duty rule also has a parallel in the R2P doctrine.223 The first two 
exceptions found in American law, which deal with negligent and 
innocent injury by the defendant224 can be paralleled to the fact 
that an R2P situation is triggered when the international 
community has failed in their responsibility to prevent. Whether 
the harm is a direct result of Western colonization or of a more 
“innocent” failure, the international community may have some 
causal relationship to the humanitarian situation. The “special 
relationship” exception can be found in the relationship of an 
individual state to its population, in the definition of sovereignty as 
responsibility. This is why a duty exists for a state to attempt to 
stop the harm that is occurring within its own borders (if it is not 
the government perpetrating such crimes), because it owes a duty 
to its people to keep them safe.225 The principle of proportionality 
                                                
220 Romohr, supra note 86, at 1035 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
314 cmt. c. (1965)).  
221 See supra notes 66-70, 170-75 and accompanying text.  
222 This efficiency developed as a result of the establishment of the United 
Nations. Prior to the attempt at the League of Nations and the United Nations, 
states did not have a global forum in which to address many of the world’s 
problems. The U.N. allowed such a forum, bringing more community and 
establishing a greater sense of duty.  
223 See supra note 34.  
224 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.  
225 If the government is the one perpetrating the crimes, the first two exceptions 
would be triggered: first in the instance of the state itself, and then in the 
instance of the international community.  
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in the R2P doctrine226 parallels to the fourth exception found in 
American tort law—voluntary assumption. Similar to how a 
rescuer who voluntarily assumes a duty to rescue cannot leave a 
victim in a worse condition than they were found, the international 
community cannot intervene and leave the state in a more dire 
condition that it was. The fifth exception, statutory duty, can 
parallel to the requirement of a Security Council or General 
Assembly resolution in order for the international community to 
intervene into a state’s domestic affairs.  
 The discussion above shows that the exceptions to the 
traditional no duty to act rule are broader than they may seem at 
first, and that it would not be an overwhelming change to take one 
further step and develop an affirmative duty to act. Such a duty 
would resemble the R2P doctrine in that there would exist an 
affirmative duty to rescue when specific factors where present.227 
Therefore, creating an affirmative duty to rescue in American law 
is not as drastic a step as some may think, but would create a 
drastically improved common law rule.  
 
                                                
226 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.  
227 This assuages the concern that people will avoid situations as discussed in 
note 68, supra, because certain factors would have to be present in order for an 
affirmative duty to apply.  
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